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1 
Abstract 
This  paper  seeks  to  explore  through  interviews  the  vocabularies  of  happiness  that 
interviewees invoke in face-to-face interactions to account for their happiness or lack 
thereof  and,  especially,  for  the  (un)happiness  of  others.  In  other  words,  how  do 
respondents  present  their  own  or  others’  happiness  -  be  they  close  or  distant 
acquaintances,  or  people  in  general,  in  an  interview  conversation?  Also,  what 
understanding of others do these accounts make visible? This work embraces a discursive 
psychological (DP) perspective, focusing on how different versions of happiness are being 
put  together  by  respondents  presenting  themselves  as  competent  and  credible 
individuals, while at the same time positioning themselves in a moral order of happiness. 
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Introduction 
The paper’s aim is to explore the variety of vocabularies that interviewees use to talk 
about their happiness and, especially, the happiness or unhappiness of others. In other 
words, how do respondents  know other people as being happy or unhappy, and what 
traits, situations or actions are invoked as signs of happiness?
2 
This  paper  embraces  a  discursive  perspective,  looking  at  how,  through 
descriptions of one’s own or others (un)happiness, speakers position themselves and 
manage issues such as agency and accountability. In this understanding, the accounts are 
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not an expression of a fixed construction in the minds of individuals, but a culturally 
available resource on which individuals can draw to build different versions of the world 
and to achieve interactional goals such as undermining alternative or counter versions 
and managing blame and responsibility (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter & Edwards, 
2001, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2008). Thus, drawing on Mills’ concept of vocabularies of 
motives (Mills, 1940), the accounts of happiness can be seen as vocabularies of happiness 
that  make  appeal,  in  a  discussion  with  one  or  more  interlocutors,  to  personal  or 
assumedly shared common knowledge about what it means and what  it takes to be 
happy. 
Vocabularies of motives and common knowledge  
From a discursive and broader constructionist approach, the social world is constructed 
and reproduced in and through discourse (Potter, 1996). According to Nikander (2006), 
what different discursive approaches havein common is “a strong social constructionist 
epistemology- the idea of language as much more than a mere mirror of the world and 
phenomena ‘out-there’, and the conviction that discourse is of central importance in 
constructing the ideas, social processes, and phenomena that make up our social world” 
(Nikander, 2006:1). 
Therefore, the discursive perspective states that accounts undestood as “forms 
of talk  that  provide  descriptions,  explanations  or justifications  of  activities,  people, 
events  and  so  forth”  (Housley  &  Fitzgerald,  2008:  242)  does  not  reflect  reality,  but 
constitutes  the  reality-at-hand,  whose  version  is  formulated  in  accordance  with 
interactional stakes such as self-positioning. As skilled negotiators of reality (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987:45), individuals use what they say to propose and, in turn, to undermine 
accounts  constituting  reality-in-the-making.  In  other  words,  individuals  are  seen  as 
competent  cultural  members  who  have  specific  interactional  purposes.  What  is  said 
varies depending on the task-at-hand and while “the meaning changes as expressed, 
moment by moment changes the lived reality” (Rogers, 2003:209).  
Following this line of thought, Potter and Hepburn (2008) propose an approach 
to commonsense knowledge by focusing attention on how different rhetorical moves 
are made to confirm or refute knowledge claims (Potter & Hepburn, 2008:22). Likewise, 
Edwards  (1999)  redefines  the  notion  of  common  knowledge,  rejecting  the  idea  that 
there is a consensus regarding mental representations. Consensus is something that is 
done, displayed, and invoked,while being open to reformulation and challenged in and 
through discourse (Edwards, 1999, as cited in Potter and Hepburn, 2008:23). Therefore, 
commonsense  knowledge  is  achieved  and  displayed  through  descriptions  that  are 
interactionally produced in talk (Potter & Hepburn, 2008:24). 
Consequently,  discursive  psychologists  are  concerned  with  how  individuals 
explain  actions  or  characterize  themselves  and  others,  and  how  they  manage  these 
accounts in terms of argumentative work (Edwards &Potter, 2005). Therefore, attention 
is focused on how different descriptions are constructed by using commonsense terms 
referring to mental and personal traits. The rhetorical organization of descriptions means     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
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choosing a  version  of reality  and  defending  it  against  alternatives. Formulations  are 
picked from socially and culturally available repertoires. These linguistic repertoires serve 
to mediate the “complex process of meaning and purpose negotiation” that occur in 
interaction (Rogers, 2003:209). 
In  this  sense,  vocabularies  of  motives  (Mills,  1940)  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the 
available culturally resources and rhetorical constructs individuals can rely on to make 
sense of contextual clues and communicate their version of events.  
Vocabularies are a cultural resource sine they draw upon common sense reason 
and emerge in specific cultural contexts: “motives vary in content and character with 
historical epochs and societal structures” (Mills, 1940: 913). This means that in a particular 
social and cultural context emerge specific dominant vocabularies. 
As  rhetorical  constructs  motives  “function  to  impose  order  upon  sets  of 
behaviors,  circumstances,  and  events  that  would  otherwise  seem  chaotic” 
(Hooper,1991:802).  Motives  are  displayed  in  speech  by  the  imputation  or  ascription  of 
psychological  commonsense  terms  referring  to  “inner  states”.  By  imputing  motive  to 
themselves and others, individuals activate culturally available ways of understanding the 
world and make sense of their own or others’ behavior in a situated context (Mills, 1940; 
Hooper 1993; Backman, 2011).   
Moreover,  through  the  vocabularies  and  the  accounting  practices  they  deploy 
speakers position themselves as moral actors (Baker and Johnson, 1998; Backman, 2011). 
The provision of vocabularies of motives implies the organization of talk in accordance 
with norms presumably shared by the speakers. Being able to produce a coherent 
version of reality taking into account the moral implications of what is being described 
constitutes an expression of social competence that is always on stake in an ongoing 
interaction.  
Understanding accounts and ascriptions of motive as features of discourse, this 
article  explores  the  various  ways  motives  are  ascribed  in  order  to  account  for  the 
(un)happiness of others or their own.  
The status of interview data 
The  status  of  interview  data  represents  a  major  concern  for  discursive  psychologists 
(Edwards, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2005). The interview situation is an unusual situation 
in the scenery of everyday life. For the respondent, the interview is a rare event that 
requires  a  series  of  specific  rhetorical  efforts  and  interactional  work.  Through  their 
rhetorical work, respondents position themselves and construct their own version of the 
social  world  (Lee&  Roth,  2004).  Presenting  themselves  as  competent  and  credible 
individuals and being able to produce a coherent version of events is always a stake in 
any conversation. 
At the same time, respondents are “constructors of knowledge in collaboration 
with  interviewers”  (Holstein  &  Gubrium,1997:114),  accounts  being  co-produced  in  the 
interview in the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. On the one 
hand, the conversation is guided by the interviewer’s research interest and the schedule Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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of topics or questions he follows throughout the interview. As stressed by Potter and 
Hepburn (2005) “researchers can and do introduce issues of stake and interest explicitly 
in interviews” (Potter & Hepburn, 2005:16). Also, the interviewer’s questions and other 
contributions (such as restatements of what has been said) play an important role in 
producing these accounts. On the other hand, the interviewee’s talk is a response to the 
challenges  the  interviewer  brings  into  the  conversation  throughout  the  prompted 
questions. Moreover, the questions posed make appeal to resources such as available 
stocks of knowledge. 
Therefore, from a discursive perspective, the analysis of interview is concerned 
with the production of meanings in the interaction between interviewer and respondent. 
Methodology  
This research is based on 10 semi-structured interviews with students from Bucharest. 
Their fields of study varied from the technical field to humanities. All my informants were 
students on the verge of graduation, a turning point in one’s life, when one worries 
about his future. From my point of view, this episode of their lives made them suitable 
for a conversation about happiness.  
Some of them were acquaientances of mine while others complete strangers. 
Although I already knew some of the students, I had no prior conversation on the subject 
of happiness with either of them. Nevertheless, the relationship between me and my 
informants  prior  to  the  interview  and  the  similarity  of  age  and  status  shaped  the 
interaction during the discussion. 
My initial focus was satisfaction with one’s home country (Romania). Afther some 
trial  interviews,  I  have  noticed  the  discussions  were  heading  towards  the  topic  of 
individual  happiness.  Then,  I  decided  to  focus  my  attention  towards  the  discursive 
construction of happiness. 
After  reviewing  my  previous  interviews,  I  compiled  a  new  interview  schedule 
comprising themes such as: the description of others as being happy or unhappy, the 
definition of happiness, happiness as a topic of conversation, happiness as a criterion in 
interacting with others, the Romanians’ happiness. The rationale behind the research 
instrument  was  to  elicit  from  my  interlocutors  some  general  formulations  about 
happiness,  starting  from  particular  descriptions.  Furthermore,  when  elaborating  the 
interview  schedule  I  had  some  assumptions  of  my  own    reffering  to  the 
conceptualization  of  happiness  and  unhappiness  as  two  opposite  entities  and  the 
observability  and  assement  of  (un)happiness  (people  asses  the  happiness  of  others 
based on external signs). These assumptions became issues of stake in the interviews . 
Regarding  the  strategies  employed  in  conducting  the  interviews,  I  tried  to 
challenge the informants’ accounts according to my research interests. The questions 
regarding one’s own happiness were more difficult to ask because I felt informants were 
reluctant to speak about their own happiness. Also, looking back I have noticed I hardly 
challenged the informants’acounts about their own happiness, although their accounts 
on this matter were evasive.     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
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I analyzed the interviews through the lens of discursive psychology following the 
analytical method of discourse analysis. As highlighted by Nikander (2006), approaching 
a constructionist perspective on discourse analysis requires embracing certain analytical 
and interpretative guidelines (Nikander, 2006). In other words, discourse analysis is more 
than a method, it implies taking up a particular theoretical perspective of the social 
world.  It  relies  on  the  assumption  that  language  is  a  means  of  constructing  and 
negotiating meanings in an interactional setting. Looking at how certain versions of 
reality are constructed through speakers accounts and how talk is rhetorically organized 
to support these accounts, the researcher can uncover the culturally available resources 
(e.g. dominant discourses) that speakers draw on to put together credible versions of 
reality. 
From  a  discursive  perspective,  discourse  is  situated,  action -oriented,  and 
constructed (Potter & Edwards, 2001). It is situated in the sense that it is produced in a 
certain context, a certain sequence of interaction, without being marked by contextual 
determinism (idem  :103). In  addition, the discourse is rhetorically organized to reject 
possible alternative versions of reality. Throughout the interaction a negotiation of the 
version of reality being sustained takes place. Whether the answers provided are being 
challenged by the researcher or not, sustaining a particular version means rejecting other 
competing versions. In this sense, discourse analysis targets the rhetorical organization 
and the argumentative and moral dimension of talk: “talk and texts can be analyzed in 
terms  of  how  they  orient  to  or  take  into  account  the  culturally  available  opposing 
argumentative  positions”  (Nikander,  2006:10).  Thus,  discourse  analysis  highlights  the 
relationship between opposite argumentative positions: “Interviews are conceptualized 
as an arena for identifying and exploring participants’ interpretative practices rather than 
an instrument for accessing a veridical account of something that happened elsewhere, 
or a set of attitudes and beliefs” (Mischler, 1986; Potter & Mulkay, 1985 apud Potter, 
1996:10). 
In this discursive perspective talk is action-oriented, whereas people do things 
through  discourse  as  justifying,  explaining,  making  allegations,  constructing  factual 
descriptions  and  presenting  themselves  in  different  ways  depending  on  the  context 
(Potter & Edwards, 2001). 
In this regard, vocabularies of motive (Mills,1940) represent one of the available 
resources individuals can rely on to construct their version of events in a particular social 
context. 
Based on the idea that the different rules and generalizations of happiness that 
respondents invoke in and through discourse constitute shared vocabularies of happiness 
grounded in common  sense argumentation, the paper aims to look at how different 
versions  of  happiness  are  being  put  together.  More  precisely,  by  vocabularies  of 
happiness I refer to ways to "motivate" happiness, to find its reasons, connections - or 
lack of connections - with the external world or the inner life. In this sense, different 
traits,  situations,  behaviors  are  discursively  presented  as  signs  of  happiness  or 
unhappiness and the rules, prescriptions or advice interviewees invoke when describing 
the (un)happiness of others or their own constitute vocabularies of happiness.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
 
 
38 
 
38 
Furthermore, the vocabularies used to talk about happiness encompass appraised 
or condemned ways of being (un)happy and emergent tensions regarding the elements 
conditioning happiness underlying a moral order of happiness.  Advancing a coherent 
version of what happiness means, taking into account the moral implications of being 
happy or unhappy is an important stake throughout the interview interaction. Through 
the various versions of happiness they advance, the interviewees present themselves as 
being different from others, in terms of happiness. Therefore, the paper aims to answer 
the following questions: 
First of all, what are the moral features of happiness embedded in discourse?  
Secondly, how is the presence or absence of agency in relation to the  happiness 
or unhappiness of others discursively argued? In other words, how accountable is a 
person for their own happiness or unhappiness? For example, is (un)happiness presented 
an outcome of how people live their own life, or does it occur independently of one’s 
choices?  
Thirdly,  what  ways  of  knowing  others  as  being  happy  or  unhappy  do  these 
vocabularies entail?  What are the relationships between visible and hidden features of 
people?  
The discursive construction of vocabularies of happiness in the interactional context of 
the interview 
The moral order of happiness in the interview situation 
From a discursive approach, morality is an intrinsic feature of discourse accomplished in 
everyday social interaction. This implies focusing on how morality is performed in speech 
acts  through  the  language  used  (e.g.  evaluative  words)  and  discursive  practice  of 
accounting, agency and blame attribution (Bergman, 1998; Backer &Johnson, 1998). 
One  of  the  main  assumptions  behind  the  discursive  study  of  morality  is  that 
descriptions of people, events, situations carry moral meanings that are grounded in 
available  cultural  systems  of  meaning.  This  yields  implications  for  the  the  analysis  of 
interview data (Backer &Johnson, 1998; Baker, 2004). 
As  stressed  by  Silverman  (2001),  interviews  are  not  true  or  false  accounts  of 
reality, but “displays of perspectives and moral forms" (Silverman, 2001:131)  meaning 
that “by analyzing how people talk to one another, one is directly gaining access to a 
cultural universe and its content of moral assumptions”(Silverman, 2001:132). 
In the same train of thought, Baker (2004) proposes the analysis of interview data 
by focusing on how different categories (Sacks, 1992, as cited in Baker) are invoked to 
build  versions  of  a  moral  order.  Thus,  categories  associated  with  actions  and 
characteristics used in speech are “descriptions of how different categories of actors act, 
could  or  should  behave”  (Baker,  2004:174).Therefore,  through  the  descriptions  they 
formulate, speakers build a world inhabited by moral charecters. 
Different versions of happiness are put together through these categories (i.e. 
types of happiness or unhappiness, types of happy or unhappy people, types of people     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
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open or opaque to evaluations of happiness) as well as rules about what true happiness 
should  mean  and  how  one  should  reach  happiness.  Hereby,  different  instances  of 
happiness encompass prescriptions regarding the pursuit of happiness. 
On the one hand, the issue is raised by various assessments regarding the positive 
connotation of happiness, the universality of the desire to be happy, or assigning blame 
for unhappiness. Such statements underline the moral dimension of happiness: 
‘everyone defines happiness in his own terms...what is certain is that most 
people  mean  by  happiness...I  understand...they  associate  happiness  with 
something  positive...a  positive  connotation...not…to  be  happy  is  good...it's 
bad to be unhappy...this is known by everyone...’(M) 
‘ ...everyone wants to be happy...but not everyone succeeds’ (C) 
‘...some (of those unhappy) are indulging in this idea ...which is wrong’ (B) 
On the other hand, different versions of happiness are implicitly built by the moral 
rules and prescriptions implied by different instances of happiness. Some of the main 
instances of happiness presented in the analyzed interviews are: happiness as content 
(happiness  is  rooted  in  the  willingness  to  be  satisfied,  to  be  at  peace  with  oneself), 
happiness as achievement (happiness is due to reaching a goal or fulfilling a dream and 
presents  itself  in  the  form  of  personal  successes  and  achievements),  happiness  as 
personal victory (the satisfaction of overcoming life’s hardships), happiness as novelty 
(new experiences are the source of happiness). 
The vocabularies deployed to talk about happiness uncover emergent tensions 
regarding the elements conditioning happiness underling a moral order of happiness. 
One defining dimension in proposing a moral order of happiness and positioning 
oneself and others in it is the relationship between money and happiness. When talking 
about  financial  security  as  a  factor  conditioning  happiness  or  which  contributes  to 
achieving  happiness,  the  respondent  either  emphasizes  the  rejection  of  the  implicit 
alternative version that ‘money can buy happiness’ - as a form of superficial happiness, or, 
aware of this connotation, he justifies himself: 
[Extract 1] Q: Throughout time have you ever talked about happiness with your 
friends or acquaintances?  
A: Mh ... 
Q: Or it came up in conversation? 
A: In one way or another... 
Q: In what way? 
A: With my roommate for example...I was talking about the health system in 
Romania... he will be doctor, and I will be a pharmacist...and we were thinking 
about how life will be in a few months when we will be done withcollege and 
we will be on our own...how will it be then? ...and the future looked gloomy at 
least because of the money...especially in his case: he will be a doctor and he 
will have a very low wage...and thus we got into more discussions including 
happiness...and  we  were  thinking:  What  does  happiness  mean?  It  doesn’t 
mean money, but money makes you happy...Even if it sounds superficial, it is Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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not!…Money can’t buy you happiness...but money brings you happiness...we 
have  to  admit  to  ourselves  that  money  does  not  only  allow  you  to  buy 
different stuff, money allows you to do things that makes you happy, to have 
some experience along with your friends...to travel, for example... different 
experiences bring those people closer...it is a special thing...you enjoy life more 
and then you are automatically happier (D) 
Interestingly, this extra effort of accounting for one’s view on happiness is not 
made  when  informants  invoke  other  factors  that  might  condition  happiness  such  as 
family, personal fulfillment and friends. This elaborate sequence about the link between 
money and happiness indicates that the respondent treats the position he expressed as 
an accountable matter in relation to commonsense assumptions. His position in regard to 
this matter is constructed gradually by refuting commonsense views (e.g. ‘money can´t 
buy you happiness’), precluding accusations (‘even if it sounds superficial, it is not’) and 
enlisting  the  recipient´s  reluctant  agreement  (‘we  have  to  admit  to  ourselves’).  By 
associating money with better interpersonal experiences, not only material goods, he 
states money’s mediated effect on happiness. 
In  this  regard,  the  answers  are  not  simple  accounts  of  reality,  but  an  implicit 
debate, a form of accounting (Baker, 2004). This particular way of putting into question 
the  money-happiness  relationship,  can  be  seen  as  a  “cultural  competence”  (idem), 
reflecting a shared knowledge on the issue. The cultural competence comes into play by 
acknowledging the existence of a common shared view that can be summarized in the 
form:  “money  doesn't  bring  happiness”.  In  this  understading,  money  is  something 
belonging to the material realm, whereas happiness is assumed to belong to a rather 
spiritual order.  The view that there is a link between money and happiness constitutes 
an emergent tension that has to be appeased by rejecting alternative versions. 
Another  defining  dimension  in  proposing  a  moral  order  of  happiness  is  the 
opposition between illusory and true happiness. By invoking this distinction, interviewees 
present themselves as being different from others in terms of happiness. Thus, illusory 
happiness  belongs  to others,  to  those  who  deceive  themselves  that  they  are  happy, 
those who do not know what makes them happy or confuse happiness with temporary 
states, fleeting emotions (joy) or superficial feelings. Knowing what makes you happy is a 
claimed  competence  and  the  absence  of  such  a  competence  constitutes  a  cause  of 
unhappiness:  
‘...depends if you knew what goal to choose, if the thing you've set yourself to 
do it was a good thing for you’ (D). 
In the extract below the respondent addresses the issue of defining happiness: 
[Extract 2] Q: Do you think that happiness is evaluated at the past tense...? You 
said ...that you draw a line and count the results...   
A: Not quite....You can feel cheerful at a moment in time and believe (that you 
are happy)...and yet you can draw a line...and you can discover that you have 
no reason (for being happy)...if we were to look at happiness as more than a     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
 
 
41 
 
41 
feeling of the moment, as a sum of achievements to say...a serious way of 
looking  at  oneself...not  necessarily...if  one  feels  good  means  he's 
happy...tomorrow  he  feels  bad  means  he’s  unhappy…it  would  rather  be  a 
fleeting mood, it would not be something serious...I think of a way of being 
happy...a feeling...I would not say a feeling, rather it is something...referring to 
the life that a man had had, and he has evaluated his life and came out with 
plus...not minus...At least this is how I understand things...Even if less good 
things had happened lately in one’s life, if you draw a line and overall comes 
out with plus it means he is happy...I do not think happiness refers to a state of 
moment...I would say (about someone in this situation) that he's in a good 
mood  or  feeling  well.  He's  feeling  well  at  that  point  in  time  but  not 
necessarily...this would not necessarily last. It is possible that a day, a week 
afterwards he will be very sad because other things came along...some less 
great things gathered up...and he's not good...that's it...(M) 
Following  a  line  of  questioning  concerning  the  assessment  of  happiness,  the 
interviewee establishes her definition of happiness by defeniding it against alternatives 
versions and securing the recipient´s agreement: ‘At least this is how I understand things’. 
Her definition of hapiness encompass a distinction between illusory  happiness in the 
form of ephemeral states and true happiness- an assessment of one’s own live, ‘a serious 
way of looking at oneself’. In this way, the interviewee positions herself as a competent 
actor who knows what happiness means, and as different from those who fall into the 
trap of mistaking happiness with a temporary state, those who do not know how to be 
happy, or who are not able to capture the true meaning of happiness.  
Agency in explaining (un)happiness  
One of my research focus was the way informants assign responsibility in the pursuit of 
happiness. In other words, is unhappiness presented as a result of how a person lives her 
own life? Is it a consequence of the external world or a consequence of a stable personal 
trait? 
Edwards  and  Potter  (2005)  argue  that  intentionality and  agency  are  managed 
through discourse without necessarily being labeled as such. Instead, such matters are 
solved  through  descriptions  of  people,  objects,  events,  context  (Edwards  &  Potter, 
2005:242). Thus, the attribution of intentionality or agency is made indirectly through the 
agent - external reality relationship (Edwards, 2005: 267). 
Accounts of other’s (un)happiness are organized in order to negotiate agency and 
responsibility.    Assigning  merit  and  guilt  in  the  success  or  failure  to  find  happiness 
constitutes a salient feature in the interviews that can be related to a cultural imperative 
positing that everyone wants to be happy. 
Moreover, respondents discursively argue for the presence or absence of agency 
when talking about the happiness of other people in order to clarify moral responsibility. 
Knowing what makes you happy and how to be happy is a presented as a competence 
that  yields  moral  implications.  For  example,  different  descriptions  of  unhappiness 
uncover the way blame is allocated to morally condemn unhappy people.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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On the one hand, happiness appears in informants’ discourses as being caused 
both by one’s own efforts and also as a result of personal traits or dispositions. On the 
other hand, unhappiness is presented mainly as a dispositional personal trait, and also 
associated  with  lack  of  agency  and  influence  on  the  outside  world.  Thus,  others’ 
happiness is rhetorically presented both as a personal disposition, and as a response to 
the external world. The following extract capture the agent - external reality relationship: 
[Extract 3] Q: How would you describe a happy man? Let's say in terms of what 
he looks like, what he does...?  
A: It does not necessarily have to be a scheme...there is a certain pattern which 
fits  each  one  of  us,  but  there  are  people  who  cannot  be  happy  ”by 
manufacture”. And, I suppose, that unhappiness is their state of...their usual 
mood...and then ... I couldn’t say that there is a pattern ... instead I could think 
of myself ... What would mean for me to be happy: to get along well with 
myself...to  be  pleased  with  myself,  to  feel  that  I  haven’t  made  many 
compromises... and that on the whole things are good. 
 Q:  You  said  that  some  people  cannot  be  happy...you  mean...are  they 
responsible for..?  
A: No. I do not think that they are responsible for it...I think it happens that 
they  have  an  inappropriate  way  of  being...wrongheaded...unhappy  with 
themselves...that's  what  characterizes  them...and  if  you  are  unhappy  with 
yourself  all  the  time  and  you  think  that  things  that  will  prevent  you  from 
becoming happier will happen… 
Looking at [Extract 3], one sees how unhappiness is defined as being embedded 
in  personal  traits.  This  way  of  defying  unhappiness  as  consequence  of  a  personal 
disposition to be grumbling and pessimistic is an example of lack of agency. 
Asked to provide a general description of a “happy man”, the respondent rejects 
the  interviewer’s  invitation  and  reframes  the  question  stateing  the  variability  of 
happiness (‘there is a certain pattern which fits each one of us’) and providing a personal 
definition  of  happiness.  At  the  same  time,  she  brings  into  discussion  a  category  of 
unhappy people as an exception to the variability of happiness (‘but there are people who 
cannot be happy “by manufacture”. And, I suppose, that unhappiness is their inner state 
of...their usual mood’).Through the follow-up question the interviewer ask for further 
explanations  regarding  those  who  “cannot  be  happy”  and  introduce  the  issue  of 
responsibility as an issue of relevance in the pursuit of happiness. 
To this new challenge, the interviewee goes on portraying unhappy people using 
references to personality traits (‘an inappropriate way of being...wrongheaded...unhappy 
with themselves... that's what characterizes them’). They are not held responsable for 
their unhappiness since it just “happens” that they have an “inappropriate way of being” 
that  impede  reaching  happiness.  Furthermore,  the  words  used  to  characterize  this 
particular category of unhappy people are strong evaluative ones (e.g. ‘inappropriate’, 
‘wrongheaded’) underlying the moral implications of happiness. 
Also, in the extract below [Extract 4], the respondent describes a happy person in 
terms of personality traits commonly associated with extroversion (cheerful, sociable).     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
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This description is also produced in response to the interviewer’s questions that strongly 
suggest that there is such a thing as a “happy man” and that he/she might be observably 
different from others (presumably unhappy): 
[Extract 4] Q: How do you think is a happy man different to others?  
A:  Well...I  repeat  myself...I  have  said...I  believe  that  a  happy  person  is  a 
cheerful person...I do not know ...sociable....  
Q: Why do you think ...why do you think some people are happy, sociable?  
A:  Well  depends  on  the  personality  of  each  of  us...and  over  time...on  the 
lifelong experience...(A)  
Her answer (‘Well...I repeat myself… I have said’) suggests a reluctancy to answer 
the question. Also, she is changing the focus from how a happy person differs from 
others to how a happy person is. To a new question concerning the description of a 
happy person as a sociable one, the respondent formulates a person´s happiness as a 
consequence of her/his personality which in turn is grounded in the ‘lifelong experience’.  
Another important aspect of the meaning of happiness invoked in the discourse is 
the  contradiction  between  the  objective  conditions  of  happiness  (to  have  it  all)  and 
subjective happiness (to be happy). This contradiction appeared as an emergent tension 
within the interview situation, no specific questions being asked on the matter. Thus, on 
this  issue,  the  talk  is  action  oriented  towards  solving  the  tension  generated  by  the 
inadequacy between the objective conditions and the feeling of happiness. Happiness is 
defined not as a rational response to the objective reality: ‘...you can be happy even if you 
have nothing’ (B), ‘...there are situations when people have little but they know how to 
make the best of it, and they can feel good…they can feel just fine…they can consider 
themselves happy’ (M), but as an individual competence to know to be happy and to be 
pleased and at peace with oneself. Happiness as being content with what one has is the 
discursive solution to this contradiction. Take the following extract: 
[Extract 5] Q: Regarding those who are unhappy do you think that they have 
difficulties in overcoming unfortunate moments in their lives? 
A:I think it’s all about optimism…a natural optimism… it’s not a forced one 
and  it’s  related  to  one’s  nature…if  a  person  has  a  lot  of  things  and 
nevertheless, he is still unhappy because he only sees the bad stuff, because 
it’s in his nature, let’s say, I don’t know,then it’s hard to be happy, because one 
can have many accomplishments and still focus on the negative side of life. On 
the other hand, there are situations when people have little but they know 
how  to  make  the  best  of  it,  and  they  can  feel  good…they  can  feel  just 
fine…and they can consider themselves happy. It depends on how they value 
what happens to them, how they relate to it (M)   
In this manner, unhappiness is defined as moral incompetence, the inability to 
defeat the personal disposition (one’s nature) which constitutes an obstacle in the way 
of happiness. Thus, unhappiness is defined not as a direct result of how a person lives his Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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own life, but as the consequence of not being able to produce happiness, and the failure 
to overcome a natural disposition to be unhappy. 
A third aspect of happiness as a moral competence appears when happiness is 
presented as a result of one’s own means: happiness is something that requires effort, 
not something that simply happens. You must want to be happy and do something about 
it, in order to be happy: 
[Extract 6] Q: Is professional success a crucial element for a successful life?  
A: Not necessarily, it depends...there are people who are mothers by definition 
and they feel good about being mothers .Then the fact that they have many 
children or well educated children defines them...there are other people who 
have  succeeded  atsame  time  to  make  progress  and  to  maintain  a 
family...maintain...managed to start a family, but professionalism was on the 
first place, maybe less (persons)...do not know...there are people who have 
sacrificed  family  to  professional  (goals)  but  I  couldn’t  say  that  they  are 
happy...at least the majority of my acquaintances suffer a lot if their family life 
isn’t good even if they have other things...so it is not necessarily...professional 
success is not a condition…it rather depends on how…what thoughts you 
have, what bothers you, what issues you have and how you think of solving 
them, how you deal with challenges, overcome obstacles…how prepared are 
you too see the best, not the worst…to overcome all (M) 
In contrast, unhappiness also occurs as a consequence of the external forces:  
[Extract 7] Q: Where do you think this discrepancy between the strategy (to be 
happy)  and  the  implementation  of  it,  or  living  (according  to  the  strategy) 
comes from? 
A: There are many things in a person’s life that one cannot control and many 
times it feels…it feels…that the higher you reach, the harder you’ll fall. You 
feel  you  immerse  yourself,  overwhelmed  by  a  problem  that  you  did  not 
expect…there are many unfortunate events in our lives and, in general, we are 
not prepared for failure…and failure makes havoc in one’s life (M) 
Earlier in the interview, the interviewee suggested there are people who have 
such a strategy to be happy, a plan to reach certain goals, but they fail to be happy. 
Pursuing the line of questioning, I challenge the respondent to formulate an explanation 
for this “discrepancy”. In response, the interviewee emphasizes the lack of control one 
has on the events in one’s life and portraits unhappy people as victims of misfortune, 
unprepared for failure, people to whom unpleasant and unexpected things "happen".  
Therefore, through interview conversations that elicit accounts of one’s own and 
others’  happiness,  participants  define  (true)  happiness  as  a  moral  competence,  and 
unhappiness as moral incompetence. At the same time, the moral universe of happiness 
also includes incompetent ways of being happy. 
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Observability of happiness 
How can one claim knowledge of others’ happiness or unhappiness? The accounts of 
happiness  invoked  in  the  conducted  interviews  can  be  captured  by  two  dominant 
vocabularies.  These  vocabularies  outline  the  question  of  public  versus  private  in  the 
immediate knowledge of others. When describing the happiness of others, respondents 
use different vocabularies to discuss the relationship between visible and hidden features 
of people. Thus, happiness is presented as a public feature, as well as a hidden feature, 
even  as  a  dissimulated  one.  Mainly  the  two  vocabularies  emphasize  the  distinction 
between being able to tell if one is truly happy or not. 
In the first vocabulary, happiness is referred to as an unobservable feature, as 
something personal, intimate, hidden that cannot be easily known, while in the second 
vocabulary happiness is seen mainly as an observable feature, that can be assessed on 
the basis of external signs and universal criteria for happiness. Although they constitute 
different, even opposing vocabularies of knowing others as being happy or unhappy, the 
two  vocabularies  of  happiness  can  coexist,  different  versions  of  happiness  being 
encountered in the same interview. Nevertheless, these accounts are mostly prompted 
by the interviewer´s questions guided by research interests. 
1) Unobservable happiness: this vocabulary underlines the discrepancy between 
appearance  and  essence  and  the  conditions  impeding  on  observing  happiness.  Both 
one’s own and others’ happiness is presented as opaque to evaluations of happiness. For 
example, in the extract below respondent cannot assess the happiness of people whom 
she does not know well or who are secretous: 
 [Extract 8] Q: Mh...are there people close to you about whom you can not 
trully say whether they are happy or not? 
A: Yes ...mh... 
Q: People about whom you have no idea whether they are happy or not? 
A:There are some people that I haven't got to know them very well or who 
have a hidden part that they'll never make it public and I cannot really know 
their true desires and intentions…Therefore I cannot decide whether they are 
happy or not...you know...even if they are close friends, it seems like I don't 
really know them very well (S) 
Also,  another  respondent  considers  that  you  cannot  know,  on  the  basis  of 
external signs, if a person is truly happy: 
[Extract  9]  Q:  What  about  other  people?  Have  you  ever  heard  in  different 
conversations people talking about others as being happy or unhappy?  
A: Yes...my grandmother talking to my aunts...when they sit and chat...they are 
talking about one or another...what have they been doing...but they do not 
use the  term happy...but they are talking about people who got married and 
are good and...I do not know...what house they have...and they believe that 
person is happy...but this may not be true...  
Q: Why it may not be true?  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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A: You cannot know if one's happy only based on the fact they have a house, a 
car...  perhaps  you  have  money  but  you  have  other  problems...I  do  not 
know...health  problems...other  issues...and you  can  be  unhappy  because  of 
health problems...My liver hurts...I'm unhappy! And my grandmother has no 
way of knowing this thing...from the outside you can believe that a person is 
happy, but if you get to know him better, interact more, you can find out some 
details...and  you  realize:  Hey,  he's  not  quite  as  I  thought...  maybe  he's 
miserable (A) 
The following extract [Extract 10] emphasizes the distance between public (what 
one shows) and hidden features (how one really is): 
[Extract 10] Q:  Do you think others consider you a happy person? 
A: From what I reveal…yes…they consider me happy. 
Q: What do you reveal? 
A: I always reveal a side of me…a wild one…to say so…always making pranks, 
telling jokes, seeking fun stuff to do…seeking fun stuff to do…and a more 
darker side, to call it…that I don’t show and many don’t know of it. 
Q: What is this dark side? What do you mean? 
A:  I  think  about  the  day-to-day  problems  when  I  am  home  alone…I  get 
stressed because of it…and that doesn’t bring happiness…that’s about it (B) 
Therefore  happiness  as  an  unobservable  feature  refers  to  misleading  external 
signs of happiness. 
This  conceptualization  emphasizes  the  subjective  criteria  versus  the  socially 
agreed upon criteria for happiness, and is closely related to the ability to tell if one is truly 
happy or not. 
2) Observable happiness: happiness is seen as something socially mediated  and as 
a public trait. The interviewees explore the idea of subjective criteria for happiness and 
being truly happy in contrast with the external signs (e.g ‘smiling’ or signs of welfare) 
and universal criteria for happiness (e.g success, family, friends). 
In  the  extract  below  the  respondent  addresses  the  issue  of  assessing  the 
happiness of others, mostly prompted by interviewer´s question:  
[Extract11] Q: Do you think that happiness can be assessed according to a list? 
A: Well, anyway, I believe that you judge people based on your own rules, your 
own beliefs…and confront them with your happiness filter and if they came 
out  on  the  other  side  it  means  that  they  are  happy…if  not,  they  are  not, 
simplified…but I don’t know if you say that people are happy just because they 
say they are…I mean you judge them too, right? I think that’s it…If someone 
were to come to me and tell me he is very happy and I would ask himwhy and 
he would explain to me, maybe I could explain back to him that he is not really 
that happy…being happy must correspond with others’ ideas of happiness. 
You  know…an  idea,  I  don’t  know…if  an  universal  or  widely  accepted 
one…you know…that happiness is the two points or lines which they must be 
reached… (S)     Bratu / Vocabularies of happiness 
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The respondent argues that happiness must be in accordance with socially agreed 
upon criteria (being happy must correspond with others’ ideas of happiness) and also the 
subjective criteria of the person making the assement (‘you judge people based on your own 
rules, your own beliefs…and confront them with your own happiness filter’). In order to render 
her account credible, the respondent makes appeal to a meaning presumbly shared by 
both speakers through the use of discourse markers  ‘you know’ and ‘right’. 
In  [Extract  12]  the  interviewee  explores  the  idea  of  knowing  others  as  being 
happy based on external signs: 
[Extract 12] Q: What makes you say she's happy, that friend of yours? What is it 
about her..? 
 A: Mh....This friend of mine she's a student...and she is very pleased with the 
faculty she is studying, has good grades and I know she is happy because I see 
her rejoice over the high grades, she also has a scholarship and recently has 
got into a relationship that makes her happy also...uh…she is a very cheerful 
person and that’s why…I don’t know…maybe I just see her as being happy 
(A) 
The respondent provides a brief description of a friend who she believes to be 
happy.  The  description  is  constructed  by  observable  facts  (good  grades,  scholarship, 
happy relationship) and a reference to personality trait (a very cheerful person). Her 
account  is  rhetorically  organized  so  as  to  suggest  that  the  description  provided  is 
objectively  presented.  Acknowledging  that  her  assement,  based  on  a  personal 
impression, may not be correct (‘I don’t know…maybe I just see her as being happy’) she 
distance herself from what is being said and presents herself  as an disinterested narrator 
(Potter, 1996). 
Therefore, this vocabulary refers to how a person is evaluated by others as being 
happy or unhappy based on some culturally shared criteria, or the criteria of the person 
making the assessment. 
Conclusions  
This paper explores how different versions of happiness are assembled in the context of 
the interview situation. The paper’s conceptual starting point is that the different rules 
and  generalizations  of  happiness  formulated  in  the  interview  encounter  can  be 
understood as vocabularies of happiness. These vocabularies outline a moral order of 
happiness that allows respondents to present themselves as competent persons. In this 
sense,  interviewee’s  accounts  uncover  appraised  or  condemned  ways  of  being 
(un)happy and emergent tensions regarding the elements conditioning happiness that 
are grounded in available cultural systems of meaning. 
A  first  moral  feature  of  discourse  is  highlighted  by  the  relationship  between 
money  and  happiness  and  the  opposition  between  illusory  and  true  happiness. 
Regarding  the  relationship  between  money  and  happiness,  respondents  position 
themselves  as  different  from  others,  in  terms  of  happiness,  by  rejecting  the  implicit Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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alternative version that money can buy happiness  - as a form of superficial happiness 
which is in contradiction with the  spiritual dimension of happiness. By bringing into 
question  the  opposition  between  illusory  and  true  happiness,  respondents  position 
themselves  as  competent  actors  who  distinguish  true  from  deceiving  happiness,  as 
different  from  those  who  mistake  happiness   for  an  ephemeral  state  or  superficial 
experience. 
The presence or absence of agency relating to the happiness or unhappiness of 
others is discursively managed in order to clarify moral responsibility. On the one hand, 
happiness appears in informants’ discourses as being caused both by one’s own efforts 
and  as  a  result  of  personal  traits  or  disposition  (optimism).  On  the  other  hand, 
unhappiness is presented mainly as a personal trait or disposition (pessimism), but also 
associated with the influence of the outside world and therefore resulting from a lack of 
agency. Thus, unhappiness is blamed on its  bearer when talking about the failure to 
overcome a natural inclination towards gloom, along with the lack of competence to 
know what makes one happy and to distinguish happiness from ephemeral states. 
Regarding the various ways of knowing others’(un)happiness, we can observe in 
interviews two dominant vocabularies. In the first vocabulary, happiness is referred to as 
an unobservable feature, as something personal, intimate, hidden that cannot be easily 
known,  while  in  the  second  vocabulary  happiness  is  seen  mainly  as  an  observable 
feature,  that  can  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  external  signsand  universal  criteria  for 
happiness. Happiness as an unobservable feature underlines the discrepancy between 
appearance and essence and the conditions impeding on observing the happiness of 
others. Happiness as an observable feature appears when speaking about happiness as 
something  visible,  something  decided  by  reference  to  common-knowledge  criteria  – 
which  can  include  ‘smiling’,  or  signs  of  welfare,  for  example.  Therefore,  interview 
encounters  are  occasions  in  which  the  interviewer  and  the  respondent  jointly  bring 
forward a moral order of happiness, in which several forms of moral competence of 
being  truly  or  falsely  happy,  or  unhappy,  are  presented  to  account  for  their  own  or 
others’ happiness. 
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